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Abstract
Although stock returns of intangibles-intensive firms tend to exceed physical assets-
intensive firms, risk-adjusted returns of actively managed mutual funds significantly
decrease (increase) with their portfolios’ exposure to intangibles-intensive (physical assets-
intensive) firms. Fund managers tend to exhibit skill when they focus on difficult-to-value
(e.g., small) firms, except when the firms are intangibles-intensive. In sum, the worst-
performing funds are in areas of the market that seem to offer ample opportunities for
professional investors due to exacerbated mispricing. The negative impact of investments
in intangibles-intensive firms on fund performance appears to be driven by extrapolation
bias and decreases with learning from experience.
I. Introduction
In the last two decades, the U.S. economy has been marked by the spec-
tacular growth of intangibles-intensive firms founded on innovation and human
capital. Prior to this, the economy was largely dominated by the physical assets-
intensive firms that emerged following the second industrial revolution of the late
1800s (see Zingales (2000)). Several strands of research postulate on the impli-
cations of the changing nature of the firm in this “new economy.” Rajan and
Zingales (2000) and Rajan and Wulf (2006) underscore the changes in governance
and flattening organizational structure, while others suggest that the valuation of
modern firms is more opaque and less related to traditional financial variables
(Core, Guay, and Van Buskirk (2003)). Some studies point to the market’s mis-
valuation of intangibles, alluding to limitations in the valuation techniques honed
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based on the physical assets-intensive firm of the 20th century.1 More generally,
given the relatively recent emergence of industries that prioritize intangibles such
as human capital and innovation, investors may value physical assets more accu-
rately due to learning from historical experience and data.2
In spite of ample evidence suggesting that the nature of the firm could af-
fect investors’ ability to value firms, how it affects the actual returns earned by
portfolio investors has remained unexplored. In this study, I examine the rela-
tion between the nature of the firm and the returns earned by a well-defined class
of stock market investors, namely, actively managed mutual funds. There are at
least two reasons why the impact of the nature of the firm on mutual fund re-
turns is an interesting topic to study. First, intangibles-intensive firms now form
a sizable segment of capital markets. Coupled with the remarkable growth of the
active portfolio management industry, any impact the nature of the firm has on
abnormal returns of mutual funds is economically meaningful information for
investors during the selection of mutual funds, for academics interested in mar-
ket efficiency, and for other stock investors during security selection. Second, re-
turn predictability and whether fund managers are skilled “arbitrageurs” who can
exploit mispricing or unskilled investors who underperform passive benchmarks
have remained strongly debated issues in the literature since Jensen (1968). Since
return predictability and the skill required to identify mispricing could vary with
the nature of the firm, it is a novel and potentially valuable lens through which to
view skill in active management.
Several recent studies argue that some mutual fund managers possess skill
and add value in active management (see Wermers (2000), Kacperczyk, Sialm,
and Zheng (2005), (2008), Cremers and Petajisto (2009)).3 Additionally, to the ex-
tent that intangibles-intensive firms are associated with higher information asym-
metries, intangible and uncertain value-relevant information, as well as deferred
resolution of uncertainty related to the long-term value of investments such as
research and development (R&D), the studies on investors’ behavioral biases pre-
dict that these firms are more susceptible to misvaluation than traditional firms.4
Existing empirical evidence is consistent with this view and suggests that
1Studies that find misvaluation of intangibles have focused on innovative inputs such as R&D
(e.g., Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique (2004), Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013)), innovative out-
puts such as patents (Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013)), and employee satisfaction (Edmans (2011)).
2See Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman (2010) and Greenwood and Nagel (2009) for evidence of
learning among investors.
3Given the vastness of the literature on mutual fund performance, it cannot be comprehensively
summarized here. Some other studies that find evidence of performance persistence and skill among
mutual funds are Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (DGTW)
(1997), Bollen and Busse (2004), Cohen, Coval, and Pa´stor (2005), Kosowski, Timmermann,
Wermers, and White (2006), and Kacperczyk and Seru (2007). Examples of representative studies with
contrasting evidence include Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Carhart (1997), and Fama and French
(2010), who conclude that mutual fund managers create little or no value with their skill, especially
net of fees.
4Aboody and Lev (2000) and others argue that there are higher information asymmetries in
intangibles-intensive firms. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (DHS) (1998), (2001), and Daniel
and Titman (2006) predict that investors are more prone to exhibit biases when the information is
intangible and uncertain. Moreover, these effects are strongest when the outcomes are deferred
(Einhorn (1980)) and information asymmetry is higher (DHS (1998), Hong and Stein (1999)).
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intangibles-intensive firms are undervalued by the market and offer more oppor-
tunities for informed investors (e.g., insiders in Aboody and Lev (2000)) than do
physical assets-intensive firms.5 So, informed fund managers could tilt their port-
folios toward intangibles-intensive firms to exploit mispricing and earn higher ab-
normal returns. Here, fund performance is likely to have a positive relation with
the degree to which the fund’s portfolio is tilted toward intangibles-intensive firms
as opposed to physical assets-intensive firms.
Alternatively, fund managers, like other investors, may exhibit behavioral bi-
ases in processing complex and intangible information (e.g., Jiang (2010)). More
generally, Griffin and Tversky (1992) posit that biases such as overconfidence
are more likely to be exhibited by experts than nonexperts when faced with am-
biguous and uncertain information. In addition, fund managers’ skill in identify-
ing mispriced firms could increase with learning and the availability of historical
data, wherein they should have better valuation techniques for physical assets-
intensive firms than intangibles-intensive firms. These notions suggest that fund
performance is likely to have a negative relation with the degree to which the
fund’s portfolio is tilted toward intangibles-intensive firms as opposed to physical
assets-intensive firms. To summarize, existing theoretical and empirical evidence
presents alternative predictions on the potential link between the nature of the firm
and mutual fund performance.
Innovative inputs such as R&D, which this study mainly focuses on with
respect to intangibles, play a substantial role in the valuation of modern firms.
To characterize the nature of the firms a fund invests in, I mainly use a mea-
sure called the “intangibles intensity ratio” (IIR). The IIR is the value-weighted
R&D-to-PPE (property, plant, and equipment) expenses ratio of individual firms
in a fund’s portfolio, with the fund’s tilt toward intangibles-intensive firms and
away from physical assets-intensive firms increasing with IIR. The IIR is stable
over time and contains information distinct from a fund’s style (e.g., value vs.
growth), self-stated objective, and other fund attributes.
Furthermore, funds tilted toward intangibles-intensive firms earn substan-
tially lower abnormal returns on average than funds tilted toward physical assets-
intensive firms. For the main analyses, funds are assigned to deciles based on IIR
in the prior quarter, where the lowest decile 1 (highest decile 10) portfolio gen-
erates significantly positive (negative) alphas in the following quarter. The IIR
decile 1–10 four-factor alpha is 2.85% per year. The return patterns persist for at
least 3 years following portfolio formation. The results are consistent with fund
managers focused on physical assets-intensive firms exhibiting more skill than
those focused on intangibles-intensive firms.
To rule out an important alternative interpretation that a fund’s IIR simply
proxies for omitted pricing factors, the tests are sharpened by augmenting the
factor models. A factor-mimicking intangibles-minus-tangibles (IMT) portfolio
that is long on stocks of high R&D-to-PPE firms and short on stocks of no-R&D
5Eberhart et al. (2004), Hirshleifer et al. (2013), and Cohen et al. (2013) document the underpric-
ing of innovative firms and argue that investors’ cognitive limitations in assessing intangibles lead to
their underpricing. Alternatively, Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson (2002) argue that omitted risk
factors explain the seeming underpricing of these firms.
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(i.e., zero R&D) firms is used to augment factor models. The passive IMT portfo-
lio yields a positive monthly return of 1.63%, due to either the relative underpric-
ing or risk of high R&D versus no-R&D firms. Adding the IMT factor strengthens
the results, with the 4-factor model augmented with IMT yielding an IIR decile
1–10 alpha of 6.54% per year. Results remain robust across other tests accounting
for omitted factors and across alternative risk adjustment methods.
Before-cost measures of fund manager skill, such as gross returns and char-
acteristic selectivity (see DGTW (1997), Wermers (2000)) provide conclusions
similar to net returns. Interestingly, funds with high IIR exhibit poorer stock se-
lection ability than those with low IIR in their intangibles-intensive as well as
physical assets-intensive holdings. The results survive various robustness tests
that include using alternative measures of innovation-related intangible assets
(e.g., patents), controlling for past intangible and total stock returns, and mul-
tivariate regression settings.
The empirical analyses also separate the effect of the nature of the firm
from the effects of general information problems linked to difficult-to-value firms.
Fund managers outperform (underperform) when they focus on physical assets-
intensive (intangibles-intensive) difficult-to-value firms. Resonating with Jensen’s
(1993) premise that investors may overvalue R&D due to the uncertainty in its
longer-term outcomes, and Daniel and Titman’s (2006) prediction that investors
misreact to intangible information, these results can be construed as fund man-
agers overpaying for the long-term benefits of intangible innovative assets of
difficult-to-value firms (e.g., small, growth firms).
Furthermore, fund managers’ trend-chasing extrapolative behavior increases
with their focus on intangibles-intensive firms and, consistent with extrapolation
bias, this behavior is detrimental for fund performance. Also, the extrapolation
bias and the negative impact of IIR on returns decreases with a fund’s prior experi-
ence. In light of the much longer historical presence of firms with physical assets,
and existing evidence that extrapolation bias decreases with investor experience
and data, these findings are consistent with the nature of the firm being associated
with behavioral biases that affect fund managers and decrease with learning.6
This evidence fits well with the growing literature that shows that behavioral
biases affect institutional investors (e.g., Frazzini (2006), Jiang (2010)), and lends
fresh insights to the recent literature on the role of learning in institutional trading
(see Greenwood and Nagel (2009)).
Finally, a fund’s maximum payoff and volatility increases, and its mean-
variance efficiency decreases, with IIR. So, the nature of the firm impacts the
welfare of fund investors via multiple channels and could be linked to investor
preferences in the selection of mutual funds.
To summarize, by using the easily observable nature of the firm to predict
fund returns and identify the environments in which fund managers are likely to
act as informed versus uninformed agents, this study contributes to the literature
on informed trading and active portfolio management. The role of the nature of
6For studies linking forecasting errors from extrapolation bias to investor inexperience and lack
of data, see Rabin (2002), Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007), Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007), and
Greenwood and Nagel (2009).
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the firm in predicting outperformance and underperformance presents an interest-
ing empirical coexistence of the conflicting ideas on skill in active management,
namely the view of fund managers as informed investors versus uninformed in-
vestors who fail to beat benchmarks. It is also an intriguing paradox that the del-
egated portfolios perform most poorly in the areas of the market that seemingly
offer the most opportunities for professional investors due to exacerbated infor-
mation problems and mispricing.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II discusses the data and sample.
Section III defines the main variable used to capture the nature of the firms held
in mutual funds’ portfolios. Section IV presents the empirical results. Section V
concludes.
II. Data and Sample Selection
The data used in this paper mainly draw from two mutual fund databases:
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual
Fund Database (MFDB) and Thomson Financial holdings database. The initial
sample consists of all unique funds that appear in CRSP MFDB over 1980 to
2009. The CRSP data on monthly returns, fees, and other fund characteristics
are obtained.7 The sample is then matched to the holdings database using a com-
bination of the Mutual Fund Links (MFLINKS) interface (see Wermers (2000))
and hand-matching, and funds located in the United States are selected. While
some funds report holdings semiannually as per mandatory disclosure require-
ments, Wermers notes that most mutual funds report holdings on a quarterly basis
since 1980. I exclude funds with less than $10 million in total net assets (TNA) as
reported in Thomson Financial, and various screens are then employed to select
actively managed diversified domestic equity funds.8 Finally, since the analyses
are based on holdings that can be matched to CRSP’s stock files, I select funds
for which the market value of the reported holdings represents at least 65% of the
quarter-end TNA. To these holdings data, I merge firm-level data from the annual
Compustat files, such as R&D expenses (item 46) and PPE (item 8).9
The final sample used in this study includes 3,165 unique actively managed
U.S. equity mutual funds during the period 1980–2009. The funds map to 98,231
unique fund-quarter observations for portfolio holdings, and 285,419 monthly
return observations. The mean (median) fund in the sample has a TNA of
7CRSP MFDB often includes multiple identifiers for the same fund if it has different share classes.
I eliminate duplicate observations by first identifying the fund identifier with the longest time series
of returns. If this step does not identify a fund uniquely, the identifier associated with the highest TNA
in the year prior to the return observation is selected.
8Index, sector, bond, international, and money market funds are excluded based on stated
objectives or using key words in the fund’s name. Funds that have objectives defined as aggressive
growth, growth, growth and income, equity income, growth with current income, income, long-term
growth, maximum capital gains, small-cap core/growth/value, large-cap core/growth/value, mid-cap
core/growth/value, multi-cap core/growth/value, unclassified, or missing are chosen.
9Unlike some other voluntary disclosures (e.g., advertising), the Statement of Financial Account-
ing Standards (SFAS) 2 rule requires firms to report R&D expenses separately. So, firms that are
missing R&D expenses data in Compustat are noted as having zero R&D expenses.
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$952 million ($170 million). The number of funds has grown substantially over
time, with 216 unique funds with observed holdings in 1980, and 1,502 in 2009.
III. Measuring Mutual Funds’ Portfolio Concentration
in Intangibles
This section describes the main measure used to characterize the nature of
the firms held by mutual funds, called the “portfolio concentration in intangibles.”
Time trends in portfolios are also reported.
Prior studies such as Brown, Fazzari, and Peterson (2009) note that the R&D
activities of publicly traded U.S. companies experienced a boom starting in the
early 1990s. Based on two measures, Figure 1 graphically illustrates the time
trend in mutual funds’ portfolio concentration in intangibles. The measures are
presented as equal-weighted means across all funds in all quarters in a calendar
year. Graph A of Figure 1 plots the main measure of a fund’s portfolio concen-
tration in intangibles used in this study (the IIR). A fund’s IIR in quarter t is the
FIGURE 1
Mutual Funds’ Portfolio Concentration in Intangibles
Graph A of Figure 1 presents the mean intangibles intensity ratio (IIR) computed for each fund in each quarter as the value-
weighted ratio of research and development (R&D) expenses to property, plant, and equipment (PPE) expenses across
all the ﬁrms in the portfolio. Graph B plots the R&D-to-sales ratio computed as the value-weighted ratio of R&D expenses










Here, ws,t is the portfolio weight of stock s in quarter t in the fund’s
portfolio of N stocks. Since R&D expenses are usually disclosed annually, (R&D/
PPE)s,t is the ratio of R&D-to-PPE expenses of firm s in the most recent year
before t. The higher (lower) the IIR of a fund, the higher is the fund’s con-
centration in intangibles-intensive (physical assets-intensive) firms. Graph B of
Figure 1 plots the value-weighted ratio of R&D expenses to sales (Compustat
item 12), where R&D expenses to sales is a popular measure of R&D
intensity.
Graph A of Figure 1 shows a visible upward trend in IIR. While in the early
1980s, the implicit R&D expenses were less than 10% of PPE expenses in the
firms held by mutual funds, this number has typically been around 40% post-
2002 and remains about four times the level in the early 1980s, even in the global
recession of 2008–2009. Graph B also reinforces the growing exposure of mutual
fund portfolios to firms with intangible assets.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on portfolio holdings using additional
measures of mutual funds’ exposure to firms with intangible assets for the full
sample (Panel A) and for selected fund objectives (Panel B). Various measures are
reported over 1980 to 2009, and also for 4 subperiods. In Panel A, the mean IIR
for the full sample is 30.8%. The two most conspicuous trends in the portfolios are
the IIR and total intangibles-to-PPE ratio, which increase from 11% to 37.4% and
15% to 208.4% between the earliest and the last period, respectively. In Panel B,
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics on Mutual Funds’ Portfolio Concentration in Intangibles
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the intangible assets of ﬁrms held by mutual funds during 1980 to 2009. Panels
A and B report statistics for the entire sample and for subsamples based on fund objectives, respectively. Mean values
(in percentages) averaged across all funds are reported. Intangibles intensity ratio (IIR) of a fund is the value-weighted
ratio of R&D-to-PPE expenses across all ﬁrms in the portfolio, weighted by the market value of holdings; % R&D stocks
is the fraction of the portfolio invested in stocks of ﬁrms that spend on R&D. Several alternative measures are computed
as the value-weighted ratio of R&D expenses to the following base variables: sales (R&D/Sales), book value of equity
(R&D/Book equity), and total assets (R&D/Assets, R&D capital/Assets). Advertising/PPE and Total intangibles/PPE are the
value-weighted ratios of advertising expenses and total intangible assets to PPE, respectively. All measures are based on
annual data for the ﬁrms from the most recent year before the portfolio quarter.
Overall 1980–1989 1990–1995 1996–2000 2001–2009
Panel A. All Objectives
Intangibles intensity ratio (IIR) 30.8 11.0 17.2 30.8 37.4
% R&D stocks 40.0 44.3 41.9 42.4 37.8
R&D/Sales 4.3 2.7 3.2 4.6 4.7
R&D/Book equity 7.4 5.3 6.3 9.3 7.2
R&D/Assets 3.3 2.7 3.0 4.0 3.1
R&D capital/Assets 6.3 5.8 6.2 7.9 5.8
Advertising/PPE 10.4 9.6 10.6 7.4 11.6
Total intangibles/PPE 140.9 15.0 45.4 77.4 208.4
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics on Mutual Funds’ Portfolio Concentration in Intangibles
Overall 1980–1989 1990–1995 1996–2000 2001–2009
Panel B. Selected Objectives
Aggressive Growth/Growth
Intangibles intensity ratio (IIR) 32.9 12.0 20.2 34.0 39.9
% R&D stocks 42.1 43.7 42.7 45.0 40.6
R&D/Sales 5.0 2.8 3.8 5.4 5.5
Growth & Income
Intangibles intensity ratio (IIR) 17.1 8.1 8.9 17.5 21.7
% R&D stocks 40.5 46.8 44.3 45.4 35.3
R&D/Sales 3.3 2.3 2.4 3.6 3.7
Small Cap
Intangibles intensity ratio (IIR) 50.4 14.3 29.3 42.7 55.0
% R&D stocks 35.8 38.7 35.5 33.9 36.2
R&D/Sales 4.4 2.7 3.6 4.4 4.5
Large Cap
Intangibles intensity ratio (IIR) 26.0 9.7 12.2 24.9 31.4
% R&D stocks 43.5 46.5 45.3 49.7 41.0
R&D/Sales 4.7 2.6 3.1 4.9 5.2
there is substantial dispersion in IIR across objectives, but the growth in IIR over
time is noticeable within all objectives.
Table 2 presents panel regressions predicting IIR. The p-values are from
Newey-West (1987) standard errors with a lag length of 3 quarters and clustered
by fund. Consistent with time-related stability, PAST IIR (i.e., the fund’s average
IIR in the prior 4 quarters) explains a substantial part (= 49.2%) of the variance
in IIR in column 1. Objective and year fixed effects in column 2 add some incre-
mental explanatory power (4.8%) beyond PAST IIR. In column 3, variables that
capture a fund’s style (SIZE SCORE, BM SCORE, and MOM SCORE) are used
to explain IIR. These variables are computed for a fund as the value-weighted
DGTW (1997) size, book-to-market (BM) ratio, and momentum quintile across
the firms in the portfolio.10 Column 3 shows that funds with higher IIR have port-
folios tilted toward small, growth, and momentum stocks. However, along with
year and objective dummy variables, the style measures only explain 36.4% of the
variance in IIR. The significantly positive relation between IIR and MOM SCORE
shows that funds that focus on intangibles-intensive firms tend to follow trend-
chasing (i.e., extrapolative) strategies. Since existing studies such as Haruvy et al.
(2007) show that extrapolative behavior diminishes with investor experience, it
is plausible that the positive relation between IIR and trend chasing diminishes
with prior experience. In column 4, two variables that proxy for a fund’s prior ex-
perience, log(FUND AGE) and log(MANAGER TENURE), are included along
with their interactions with MOM SCORE. The significantly negative coefficients
on MOM SCORE × log(FUND AGE) and MOM SCORE × log(MANAGER
TENURE) suggest that trend chasing in intangibles-intensive investments de-
creases with prior experience. Note that these tests do not directly address
10I am grateful to Russ Wermers for making the DGTW (1997) stock benchmark data available.
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TABLE 2
Multivariate Regressions Explaining Portfolio Concentration in Intangibles
Table 2 reports the results for regressions explaining the intangibles intensity ratio (IIR) of actively managed mutual funds
computed for each fund in each quarter t during the period 1980–2009. IIR is as deﬁned in Table 1. PAST IIR is the fund’s
average IIR in the 4 prior quarters t − 4 to t − 1. A fund’s SIZE SCORE, BM SCORE, and MOM SCORE are the value-
weighted DGTW (1997) size quintile, DGTW BM quintile, and DGTW momentum quintile in quarter t − 1, across all the
stocks in the fund’s portfolio in the quarter, respectively. The log(FUND AGE) and log(MANAGER TENURE) are the natural
logarithms of the age (in years) of the fund computed from the ﬁrst offer date, and the number of years that the manager has
managed the fund as of the end of quarter t− 1 plus 1, respectively. EXPENSE RATIO and TURNOVER are annual values
for the expense ratio and turnover of the fund in the prior year. The log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of the fund’s total net
assets ($mill) as of the end of quarter t− 1. PAST FLOWS is the mean monthly growth in TNA due to new money over the 3
months in quarter t− 1. INDUSTRY CONC is the fund’s Herﬁndahl index across 10 industry categories in the quarter t− 1
(see Kacperczyk et al. (2005)), computed as the sum of squared weights in the 10 industries. ACTIVE SHARE is deﬁned
as the share of a fund’s portfolio holdings that differ from the fund’s benchmark index (see Cremers and Petajisto (2009)) in
the quarter t−1. The speciﬁcations in columns 2–6 include objective and year ﬁxed effects. The p-values (in parentheses)
are based on Newey-West (1987) robust standard errors with a lag length of 3 quarters, and account for clustering at the
fund level. ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: IIR (t)
1 2 3 4 5 6
PAST IIR 0.817** 0.740** 0.660** 0.649** 0.645**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SIZE SCORE −0.042** −0.017** −0.017** −0.016**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BM SCORE −0.191** −0.074** −0.077** −0.076**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MOM SCORE 0.059** 0.032** 0.028** 0.027**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MOM SCORE× log(FUND AGE) −0.006** −0.006** −0.006**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MOM SCORE× log(MANAGER TENURE) −0.003* −0.002 −0.002
(0.05) (0.20) (0.28)
log(FUND AGE) 0.022** 0.023** 0.023**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(MANAGER TENURE) −0.015** −0.009 −0.010*
(0.00) (0.06) (0.04)












Objective ﬁxed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 96,303 96,303 93,433 70,589 70,589 70,589
R2 0.492 0.540 0.364 0.556 0.558 0.560
whether the trend chasing by funds focused on intangibles-intensive firms is based
on rational expectations or extrapolation bias. This issue is examined later in
Section IV.G.
The following fund attributes also known to be related to performance are
added in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2: fund size (log(TNA)), fund flows over
the 3 months in the quarter (PAST FLOWS), EXPENSE RATIO, TURNOVER,
INDUSTRY CONC, and ACTIVE SHARE (see Cremers and Petajisto (2009)),
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where the latter four measures reflect activeness.11 INDUSTRY CONC is com-
puted as the sum of squared portfolio weights in the 10 industry categories in
Kacperczyk et al. (2005). In general, funds with less experienced managers, higher
turnover, recent outflows, and higher industry concentration tend to have higher
IIR. Comparing the R2 of the most inclusive model in column 6 with column 1,
PAST IIR has by far the most explanatory power over IIR.
IV. Empirical Results on Mutual Fund Performance
This section examines the link between IIR and the performance of actively
managed funds.
A. Performance Measurement
To begin examining fund performance, I first assign each fund to a decile
portfolio p at the end of quarter t based on its IIR. In each month in quarter t + 2,
decile portfolio p’s excess return (rp,t) is computed as the equal-weighted mean
excess return of the funds in the portfolio.12 The performance of each decile port-
folio (re-formed quarterly) is then evaluated based on various factor adjustment
models, with the most inclusive specification being the following 5-factor model:
rp,t = αp + β
MKT
p (RMt − RFt) + βSMBp SMBt + βHMLp HMLt(2)
+βMOMp MOMt + βLIQp LIQt + εp,t.
Here, (RMt−RFt) is the monthly return on a value-weighted market proxy portfo-
lio minus T-bills; SMBt, HMLt, MOMt, and LIQt are returns on factor-mimicking
portfolios for size, BM ratio, momentum, and liquidity, respectively (see Fama
and French (1993), Carhart (1997), and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)).13 Each
portfolio’s factor loadings (β̂ps) in month t are obtained from time-series regres-
sions over a 36-month window t − 36 to t − 1. The abnormal return, or alpha,
for decile portfolio p (αp) is then computed as the monthly excess return minus
the product of the factor loadings and factor realizations in month t. Results are
generally presented for multiple factor models, which vary in the regressors.
Table 3 reports the mean IIR and factor loadings of the IIR decile portfo-
lios. Column 1 reveals considerable dispersion in IIR between decile 1 (low) and
11Following prior studies, the fund flows in month t (i.e., the growth in TNA due to new invest-
ments) is calculated as
FLOWt =
TNAt − TNAt−1(1 + Rt)
TNAt−1
,
where, Rt is the monthly net return of the fund during month t, and TNAt is the fund’s total net asset
value at the end of month t as reported in CRSP. Outliers are eliminated by winsorizing the 2.5% tails.
12The returns for the decile portfolios are observed in the following quarter t+2 to allow for the port-
folio holdings to become public sometime during the 3 months following quarter t (see Kacperczyk
et al. (2008)). This additional implementation lag does not affect the results substantially, since the
IIR measure is persistent over time.
13I am grateful to Kenneth French and Lubos Pastor for providing the factor data.
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TABLE 3
Factor Loadings and Persistence of Mutual Funds’ Portfolio Concentration in Intangibles
At the end of each quarter t, funds are sorted into decile portfolios based on their IIR as deﬁned in Table 1. Column 1
reports the mean IIR of the funds in each decile portfolio in the ranking quarter t. Columns 2–6 report the time-series mean
of the factor loadings (betas) for each decile portfolio estimated from the following 5-factor model
rp,t = αp + β
MKT
p (RMt − RFt) + βSMBp SMBt + βHMLp HMLt + βMOMp MOMt + βLIQp LIQt + εp,t.
Here, rp,t is the excess return on the decile portfolio p in month t, computed as the equal-weighted mean monthly excess
net fund return; RMt−RFt, SMBt, and HMLt are the 3 factors from Fama and French (1993); MOMt is the momentum factor
used in Carhart (1997); and LIQt is the liquidity factor in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). The factor loadings in month t are
obtained by regressing rp,t on the factor realizations over t− 36 to t− 1. The “% funds in±1 decile rank assigned at t in
quarter” is the fraction of funds ranked in a decile in the ranking quarter t that remain within one rank in 5 future quarters
t + 1 through t + 5. The p-values in parentheses are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors (lag length 12 months).
** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
% Funds in
±1 Decile Rank
Portfolio-Level Factor Loadings Assigned at t in Quarter








p t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5
IIR Decile (t) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Decile 1 (most tangibles) 0.033 0.850 0.283 0.189 –0.016 0.018 96.8 95.1 93.9 93.2 93.2
Decile 2 0.075 0.895 0.270 0.136 –0.025 0.012 94.7 92.8 91.6 91.4 90.9
Decile 3 0.106 0.900 0.247 0.068 –0.018 0.003 91.9 88.2 86.5 86.1 86.3
Decile 4 0.136 0.912 0.235 –0.017 0.001 0.008 88.8 84.4 82.5 83.0 83.7
Decile 5 0.163 0.916 0.206 –0.086 0.008 0.004 87.7 83.5 82.0 82.3 82.8
Decile 6 0.191 0.926 0.251 –0.158 0.001 0.011 87.1 82.2 81.1 81.0 81.4
Decile 7 0.230 0.943 0.285 –0.237 0.016 –0.012 88.6 83.8 82.4 82.5 83.0
Decile 8 0.286 0.963 0.378 –0.306 0.034 –0.012 90.8 87.0 85.4 84.5 84.8
Decile 9 0.393 0.977 0.524 –0.451 0.041 –0.029 93.5 90.7 89.5 88.5 88.5
Decile 10 (most intangibles) 0.686 1.006 0.739 –0.561 0.061 –0.044 96.4 94.4 93.2 92.3 92.2
Decile 1 – 10 –0.653** –0.156** –0.456** 0.750** –0.077** 0.062**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
decile 10 (high). The implicit R&D expenses are 3.3% (68.6%) of PPE on aver-
age for decile 1 (decile 10). The factor loadings in columns 2–6 show that funds
with higher IIR tend to be more cyclical; comove more with small cap, growth,
and momentum stocks; and have less exposure to liquidity risk than funds with
lower IIR. Indicating strong persistence in the nature of the firms held by a fund,
96.8% (96.4%) of funds ranked in IIR decile 1 (decile 10) in the ranking quarter t
remain within one rank of the assignment in quarter t + 1 (column 7). The funds’
movement across decile ranks remains low beyond t + 1.
B. Baseline Results
Table 4 reports fund performance using the portfolio-level approach in
columns 1–4 and an alternative fund-level approach in columns 5–8. The decile
1–10 returns represent a zero-investment strategy that goes long (short) on funds
tilted toward physical assets-intensive (intangibles-intensive) firms. Overall, the
funds tilted toward intangibles-intensive firms significantly underperform the
funds tilted toward physical assets-intensive firms. For instance, in column 1,
the lowest IIR decile outperforms the highest IIR decile by a statistically sig-
nificant 4.32% per year in terms of the 1-factor alpha. The 3-, 4-, and 5-factor
alphas of the decile 1–10 portfolio are statistically and economically significant
at 1.79%, 2.85%, and 2.67% per year, respectively. These results can be attributed
to the underperformance of high-IIR funds combined with the outperformance of
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TABLE 4
Mutual Fund Performance and Portfolio Concentration in Intangibles
Columns 1–4 of Table 4 report the time-series means of the portfolio-level alphas over the 3 months in quarter t + 2,
computed in month m as the excess return on the portfolio minus the product of the factor realizations in month m and the
portfolio’s factor loadings estimated over the 36-month rolling window m− 36 to m− 1. The 1-, 3-, 4-, and 5-factor alphas
are obtained from the regression described in Table 3 using the ﬁrst regressor (Jensen (1968)), the ﬁrst three regressors
(Fama and French (1993)), the ﬁrst four regressors (Carhart (1997)), and all ﬁve regressors (Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)).
Columns 5–8 report the time-series means of the fund-level alphas over the 3 months in quarter t+2 computed following the
rolling-regression method based on the time series of monthly excess return for individual funds. All returns are reported
in percentages on a per year basis. The p-values based on Newey-West (1987) robust standard errors with a lag length
of 12 months are reported in parentheses. ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Performance Computed Performance Computed
at the Portfolio Level at the Fund Level
1-Factor 3-Factor 4-Factor 5-Factor 1-Factor 3-Factor 4-Factor 5-Factor
Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha
IIR Decile (t) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Decile 1 (most tangibles) 1.37* 1.15* 1.58** 1.54** 1.32 0.70 0.72 0.85
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15)
Decile 2 –0.06 0.12 0.45 0.80 –0.14 –0.21 –0.22 0.01
(0.95) (0.83) (0.40) (0.12) (0.85) (0.68) (0.53) (0.98)
Decile 3 0.29 0.40 0.76 0.40 0.14 0.23 0.04 0.17
(0.71) (0.43) (0.15) (0.41) (0.84) (0.48) (0.91) (0.61)
Decile 4 –0.11 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.03 0.05 –0.34 –0.14
(0.88) (0.61) (0.58) (0.55) (0.95) (0.89) (0.27) (0.65)
Decile 5 –0.57 –0.20 –0.06 –0.02 –0.31 –0.04 –0.38 –0.29
(0.39) (0.70) (0.92) (0.98) (0.61) (0.89) (0.25) (0.39)
Decile 6 –0.76 –0.27 –0.10 –0.14 –0.98 –0.60 –0.97* –0.86**
(0.34) (0.61) (0.86) (0.80) (0.15) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01)
Decile 7 –0.77 –0.03 –0.18 –0.06 –1.05 –0.38 –0.46 –0.72
(0.43) (0.96) (0.78) (0.93) (0.23) (0.31) (0.24) (0.10)
Decile 8 –0.91 –0.26 –0.09 –0.02 –1.23 –0.20 –0.69 –0.76*
(0.10) (0.71) (0.90) (0.98) (0.25) (0.43) (0.14) (0.05)
Decile 9 –1.54* –0.33 –0.31 –0.44 –1.22 –0.64 –0.79 –0.67
(0.05) (0.58) (0.72) (0.38) (0.20) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
Decile 10 (most intangibles) –2.95** –0.64 –1.27* –1.13 –1.81** –0.95 –1.31* –1.68*
(0.01) (0.63) (0.04) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10) (0.05) (0.04)
Decile 1− 10 4.32** 1.79* 2.85** 2.67** 3.13** 1.65** 2.03** 2.53**
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Quintile 1− 5 2.86* 1.28* 1.78** 1.66* 1.77* 1.32 1.37* 1.56*
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.04)
low-IIR funds. The alphas appear to decline with increasing IIR deciles nearly
uniformly.
In columns 5–8 of Table 4, I estimate the risk-adjusted returns at a fund
level. Here, a fund’s factor loadings in month t are obtained from regressing the
fund’s monthly excess returns on the benchmark factors over t − 36 to t − 1.
The mean fund-level alphas across funds in each decile portfolio averaged over
all the months are reported and provide similar conclusions. The results so far
are consistent with mutual fund managers exhibiting more skill when they
focus on traditional physical assets-based firms than when they focus on modern
intangibles-intensive firms. Hereafter, the results of nonparametric analyses are
reported using the portfolio approach, but they are robust to using the fund-level
approach and other commonly used risk-adjustment methods.14
14In unreported robustness checks, results remained unchanged on using two additional risk ad-
justment methods. First, the alpha of each decile portfolio equaled the intercept of the time-series
Gupta-Mukherjee 177
C. Omitted Factors, Stock Returns, and IIR
An important concern in interpreting the central results is whether there are
omitted systematic risk or mispricing factors common to the types of stocks held
by funds that vary in their IIR. In this case, it is not straightforward to interpret
the main results as fund managers of funds with low IIR exhibiting more skill in
generating abnormal returns than fund managers of funds with high IIR.
To address these concerns, I first augment the common 4- and 5-factor mod-
els with a new factor that captures the cross section of expected stock returns
linked to the nature of the firm. Every month, I compute the return on a factor-
mimicking IMT portfolio that goes long high-R&D stocks and short no-R&D
stocks.15 The IMT factor can be viewed as an omitted risk factor (see
Chambers et al. (2002)), or a mispricing factor capturing systematic misvaluation
of intangibles-intensive versus physical assets-intensive firms. The interpretation
of IMT is not of particular importance in this study, since it is meant simply to
account for systematic factors linked inherently to IIR that also predict stock re-
turns. The goal is to incorporate IMT as a factor into the model generating a fund’s
abnormal return, so that the loading and premium on IMT captures the propor-
tion of mean return attributable to the passive strategy of going long high-R&D
stocks and short no-R&D stocks. A fund’s loading on IMT should increase with
its IIR.
Figure 2 plots the mean equal-weighted monthly return on the IMT portfo-
lio in each year. Consistent with existing studies, high R&D-to-PPE firms tend
to earn higher stock returns than no-R&D firms. The IMT portfolio earns a sub-
stantial 1.63% per month on average. This is the first indication that augmenting
factor models with IMT should, in fact, increase the spread in abnormal returns
between funds with low IIR and funds with high IIR rather than “explain” this
return spread.
Table 5 reports the abnormal returns obtained from adjustments for omit-
ted factors linked to the nature of the firm. Column 1 reports the mean load-
ings on IMT (δIMTp ) for IIR decile portfolios for the augmented 5-factor model
with IMT as a sixth regressor. As expected, the lower (higher) IIR deciles load
negatively (positively) on IMT. Moreover, the main results hold, with the decile
1–10 alphas exceeding 6.54% per year for the augmented 4- and 5-factor mod-
els. In sum, controlling for omitted factors in the pricing of firms that vary in
regression of the monthly portfolio excess returns on common risk factors. Second, the alphas for
each decile portfolio are computed following the two-step Fama and MacBeth (1973) method, where
cross-sectional regressions are run in each time period for each decile on common risk factors, fol-
lowed by time-series tests to determine the alphas from the intercepts. These additional methods serve
to confirm the results when risk is adjusted by in-sample estimations, which could be important when
R&D investments can change a firm’s systematic risk (see Berk, Green, and Naik (2004)). The results
are available from the author.
15For the IMT portfolio, at the end of each year, the R&D-to-PPE ratios for eligible stocks are
computed where eligible stocks are selected following Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). The stocks are
then sorted into 11 portfolios: portfolio 0 with zero R&D-to-PPE stocks (“no-R&D stocks”), and
10 equal-sized portfolios with nonzero R&D-to-PPE ranging from portfolio 1 (“low-R&D stocks”)
to 10 (“high-R&D stocks”). The return on the IMT portfolio is the return on the equal-weighted
portfolio 10 minus portfolio 0. The subsequent results are robust to alternative specifications of the
IMT portfolio, including value weighting the portfolios.
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FIGURE 2
IMT Portfolio Return
Figure 2 plots the average monthly equal-weighted return for the intangibles-minus-tangibles (IMT) portfolio that goes long
high-R&D stocks and short no-R&D stocks. High-R&D stocks is the equal-weighted portfolio of stocks ranked in the highest
decile of R&D-to-PPE in themost recent year. No-R&D stocks is the equal-weighted portfolio of stocks with zero R&D-to-PPE
in the most recent year.
TABLE 5
Mutual Fund Performance Adjusted for Omitted Factors in Factor Adjustment Models
Table 5 reports the portfolio-level alphas for IIR portfolios formed in quarter t over the 3 months in quarter t + 2. The alphas
are obtained from the regression of the monthly net excess return on decile portfolio p in month t (rp,t) on all or some of the
5 factors deﬁned in Table 3, in addition to an IMT and UMO factor. IMT is the intangibles-minus-tangibles factor that is long
on high-R&D stocks and short on no-R&D stocks, as deﬁned in Figure 2. UMO is the underpricing-minus-overpricing
misvaluation factor in Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010) that is long on underpriced and short on overpriced stocks. The
4- (5-) factor w/IMT alpha is obtained from the above regression using the ﬁrst four (ﬁve) regressors and IMTt. The
5-factor w/UMO (w/UMO, IMT) alpha is obtained from the above regression using the ﬁrst ﬁve regressors with UMO (UMO
and IMT). Here, δIMTp is the time-series mean of the coefﬁcient on IMTt obtained from the 5-factor w/IMT speciﬁcation.
All returns are reported in percentages on a per year basis. The p-values based on Newey-West (1987) robust standard
errors with a lag length of 12 months are reported in parentheses. ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and
5% levels, respectively.
5-Factor w/
4-Factor w/ 5-Factor w/ 5-Factor w/ UMO, IMT
δIMT IMT Alpha IMT Alpha UMO Alpha Alpha
IIR Decile (t) 1 2 3 4 5
Decile 1 (most tangibles) −0.539** 2.57** 2.63** 1.82** 2.93**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Decile 2 −0.491** 1.20* 1.20* 0.83 1.16*
(0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.04)
Decile 3 −0.237** 1.16* 1.27* 0.41 1.47**
(0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.43) (0.01)
Decile 4 −0.235** 0.70 0.74 0.38 1.03*
(0.00) (0.18) (0.17) (0.48) (0.05)
Decile 5 −0.105** 0.22 0.27 0.66 0.85
(0.00) (0.70) (0.63) (0.29) (0.13)
Decile 6 −0.021 −0.13 −0.17 0.23 0.34
(0.49) (0.82) (0.76) (0.67) (0.55)
Decile 7 0.105** −0.35 −0.21 0.27 0.75
(0.00) (0.58) (0.74) (0.64) (0.24)
Decile 8 0.317** −0.50 −0.43 0.18 0.81
(0.00) (0.48) (0.56) (0.80) (0.26)
Decile 9 0.541** −1.43 −1.28 0.05 −0.11
(0.00) (0.10) (0.20) (0.97) (0.87)
Decile 10 (most intangibles) 1.683** −3.97** −3.94** −0.22 −1.33
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.77) (0.08)
Decile 1− 10 −2.222** 6.54** 6.57** 2.04** 4.26**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Quintile 1− 5 −1.605** 4.56** 4.48** 1.53* 2.10**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00)
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R&D-to-PPE increases, rather than explains, the underperformance of high-IIR
funds relative to low-IIR funds. In columns 4 and 5 of Table 5, I also include
Hirshleifer and Jiang’s (2010) underpriced-minus-overpriced (UMO) factor to ac-
count for potential systematic mispricing of the style of stocks held. Consistent
with earlier results, the IIR decile 1–10 alphas remain significantly positive.
D. Performance Decomposition: Fund Manager Skill, Fees,
and Transaction Costs
In earlier sections, the results reported were based on net returns, which are a
function of fund managers’ skill as well as fees and transaction costs, and measure
the returns passed on to investors. This section examines the relation between IIR
and the components of fund performance, among which before-cost returns reflect
the value added by managers using their selection and timing skills.
Table 6 reports the components of fund returns for the IIR decile portfolios
using the performance decomposition approach of DGTW (1997) and Wermers
(2000), who decompose returns into the fund manager’s stock selection, style se-
lection, timing ability, fees, and transaction costs. The following six components
of returns are analyzed: gross holdings return (i.e., holdings’ buy-and-hold stock
return), characteristic selectivity (CS), characteristic timing (CT), average style
(AS), annual expenses (EXPENSE RATIO), and TURNOVER capturing trans-
action costs. The measures are further described in Wermers. By splitting each
fund’s portfolio into stocks with below-mean (low R&D/PPE) and above-mean
(high R&D/PPE) R&D-to-PPE ratios in the quarter, Table 6 also reports the gross
holdings return and CS of the subportfolios of stocks with low R&D-to-PPE and
high R&D-to-PPE separately.16 Table 6 shows that funds with high IIR charge
higher fees and incur more transaction costs than funds with low IIR to at least
partially explain their after-cost underperformance. However, the funds with high
IIR also show significantly poorer before-cost stock selection skills relative to
funds with low IIR. In columns 1 and 3, the funds in IIR decile 1 pick stocks that
outperform the stocks picked by funds in IIR decile 10 by 314 (213) basis points
per year based on gross returns (CS). Interestingly, the high-IIR funds under-
perform low-IIR funds in physical assets-intensive holdings (columns 2 and 5)
as well as intangibles-intensive holdings (columns 3 and 6). The disparity in
the performance of the majority holdings of funds focused on physical assets-
intensive firms versus those focused on intangibles-intensive firms is notable. The
low R&D/PPE portfolio of IIR decile 1 funds outperforms the high R&D/PPE
portfolio of IIR decile 10 funds by a CS of 3.95%. The decile 1–10 difference in
AS of 1.39% is also positive and statistically significant. Finally, the IIR decile 10
funds on average have expense ratios that are 18 basis points and turnovers that are
nearly 43% higher on an annual basis than IIR decile 1 funds. The funds with high
IIR exhibit the “anomaly” of inferior before-fee performers charging higher ex-
pense ratios documented by Gruber (1996) and Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009),
among others.









Return Decomposition for Mutual Funds and Portfolio Concentration in Intangibles
The following components of fund returns are reported in Table 6: value-weighted return on the stock portfolio (gross holdings return), characteristic selectivity (CS), characteristic timing (CT), average style
(AS), EXPENSE RATIO, and TURNOVER. All and low (high) R&D/PPE represent the fund’s whole portfolio and subportfolio of stocks with below (above) mean values of R&D/PPE in the quarter, respectively. The
components of fund returns are computed on a monthly basis and reported as percentages per year. The expense ratio and turnover are reported as annual percentage values. The components are reported for
each decile portfolio as an equal-weighted average across all funds in the decile across all months. The p-values based on Newey-West (1987) robust standard errors with a lag length of 12 months are reported
in parentheses. ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Gross Holdings Return CS
Low− Low−
Low High High Low High High EX-
R&D/ R&D/ R&D/ R&D/ R&D/ R&D/ PENSE TURN-
All PPE PPE PPE All PPE PPE PPE CT AS RATIO OVER
IIR Decile (t) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Decile 1 (most tangibles) 14.70 14.75 13.87 0.88 1.28 1.33 0.50 0.83 −0.01 13.43 1.16 70.28
Decile 2 13.52 13.53 13.47 0.06 1.25 1.26 1.11 0.15 0.06 12.22 1.13 71.67
Decile 3 14.14 16.32 13.87 2.45** 1.79 1.94 0.54 1.40** −0.08 12.43 1.08 71.20
Decile 4 13.49 15.02 13.26 1.76** 1.77 1.97 0.42 1.55** −0.16 11.88 1.09 75.49
Decile 5 12.92 14.85 12.61 2.24** 1.72 1.91 0.54 1.37* −0.81 12.02 1.13 76.13
Decile 6 12.90 13.77 12.74 1.03* 1.02 1.11 0.57 0.54 0.21 11.67 1.11 80.20
Decile 7 12.47 12.33 13.08 −0.75 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.01 0.54 11.48 1.14 88.95
Decile 8 12.79 12.73 13.01 −0.28 0.55 0.45 0.91 −0.46 0.22 12.02 1.12 93.06
Decile 9 11.80 12.27 10.32 1.95* 0.05 0.12 −0.17 0.29 0.42 11.33 1.15 104.44
Decile 10 (most intangibles) 11.55 13.19 8.28 4.91** −0.85 −0.01 −2.62 2.61** 0.36 12.04 1.34 113.20
Decile 1− 10 3.15** 1.56** 5.59** 2.13** 1.34** 3.12** −0.37 1.39* −0.18** −42.92**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
Quintile 1− 5 2.04** 1.43** 4.02** 1.35 1.18 1.72* −0.09 0.99 −0.08* −39.23**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.88) (0.13) (0.04) (0.00)
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E. Additional Robustness Checks
This section reports robustness tests that assess alternative explanations for
the main results.
1. Does IIR Proxy for Past (Intangible or Total) Stock Returns?
Given the evidence in Daniel and Titman (2006) and Jiang (2010), if the
IIR measure overweights innovative firms with high recent intangible returns, the
main results may be explained by IIR proxying for stocks that are more likely to
experience reversals of the intangible component of returns. This would make the
interpretation based on fund managers’ skill in valuing intangibles less clear.
Table 7 reports fund performance in settings that control for past stock
returns. In Panel A, funds are sorted into quartiles based on the funds’ value-
weighted intangible stock returns over the 1-year window, and (independently)
into quintiles based on IIR. The funds with high IIR continue to underperform
the funds with low IIR within groups of funds with similar exposure to intangible
stock returns. The results in Panel B based on a 5-year window are similar.
TABLE 7
Past Stock Returns and Portfolio Concentration in Intangibles
Panels A and B of Table 7 report the portfolio-level 4-factor alphas from monthly net excess returns in quarter t + 2 for
portfolios formed in quarter t by independently sorting funds into quintile portfolios based on IIR, and quartile portfolios
based on the intangible returns on the stocks they hold. In Panel A (Panel B), the intangible returns on the stocks held by
a fund are computed as the value-weighted intangible stock returns, where a stock’s intangible return is computed in the
most recent calendar year as the intangible component of the 1-year (5-year) stock return. Panel C reports the portfolio-level
4-factor alphas from monthly net excess returns for quintile portfolios sorted based on IIR in quarter t, where the portfolio
weights used to compute IIR are based on stock prices lagged by m months from the last month of quarter t, where m is
3, 6, 9, or 12 months. The p-values based on Newey-West (1987) robust standard errors with a lag length of 12 months
are reported in parentheses. ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
IIR Quintile (t) Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Panel A. Sorting on Past Intangible Stock Returns (1 year)
Quintile 1 (most tangibles) 0.80 0.89 0.61 1.79*
Quintile 2 0.39 0.23 0.46 0.96
Quintile 3 0.02 −0.60 −0.45 −0.88
Quintile 4 −0.01 −0.59 −0.48 −0.74
Quintile 5 (most intangibles) −0.19 −0.63 −1.08 −1.58*
Quintile 1− 5 0.99 1.52* 1.69** 3.37**
(0.19) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00)
Panel B. Sorting on Past Intangible Stock Returns (5 year)
Quintile 1 (most tangibles) 0.39 0.87* 0.70 1.24*
Quintile 2 0.40 −0.21 0.17 0.75
Quintile 3 −0.05 −0.40 −0.84 −0.56
Quintile 4 −0.19 −0.21 −0.68 −0.91
Quintile 5 (most intangibles) 0.09 −0.70 −1.33 −1.45*
Quintile 1− 5 0.30 1.57* 2.03** 2.69**
(0.60) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
IIR Quintile (t) m = 3 m = 6 m = 9 m = 12
Panel C. Portfolio Weights from Stock Prices Lagged by m Months
Quintile 1 (most tangibles) 1.81** 1.79** 1.60* 1.30*
Quintile 2 0.35 0.45 0.32 0.28
Quintile 3 −0.24 −0.26 −0.29 −0.40
Quintile 4 −0.80 −0.80 −0.75 −0.72
Quintile 5 (most intangibles) −1.21* −1.17 −1.12 −1.20*
Quintile 1− 5 3.02** 2.96** 2.72** 2.50**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
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The setting in Panel C of Table 7 controls for past total (instead of intangible)
stock returns. To separate out the impact of recent price run-ups that may proxy
for mispricing, I compute IIR at the end of quarter t from portfolio weights that
use lagged stock prices instead of end-of-quarter prices. I report returns in quarter
t + 2 for funds sorted into IIR quintiles, where the IIR uses stock prices lagged by
1–4 quarters. The results remain very robust, thereby ruling out patterns in recent
stock returns as an explanation for the negative relation between IIR and future
fund returns.
2. Long-Term Fund Performance
Another possibility that has not been considered so far is that funds with
higher IIR benefit from market corrections of underpriced stocks over longer hori-
zons. Table 8 addresses this issue by using decile ranks based on longer lags in
IIR. Table 8 reports 4-factor alphas for the IIR decile portfolios with IIR measured
from holdings lagged by up to 12 quarters, reported in 2-quarter increments. The
decile 1–10 return spread remains statistically and economically meaningful until
10 quarters following the measurement of IIR. Thus, IIR predicts long-term fund
performance.
TABLE 8
Long-Term Performance and Portfolio Concentration in Intangibles
Table 8 reports the portfolio-level 4-factor alphas from monthly net excess returns for decile portfolios in quarters t + 4,
t + 6, t + 8, t + 10, and t + 12 based on the rolling-regression method described in Table 4. The 4 benchmark factors
used to compute alphas are (RMt − RFt), SMBt, HMLt, and MOMt and are as deﬁned in Table 3. The p-values based on
Newey-West (1987) robust standard errors with a lag length of 12 months are reported in parentheses. ** and * indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
4-Factor Alpha in Quarter
t + 4 t + 6 t + 8 t + 10 t + 12
IIR Decile (t) 1 2 3 4 5
Decile 1 (most tangibles) 1.42** 1.21* 1.12* 1.08* 0.77
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.15)
Decile 2 0.63 0.63 0.67 0.73 1.00
(0.25) (0.21) (0.21) (0.17) (0.08)
Decile 3 0.61 0.52 0.77 0.21 0.76
(0.23) (0.34) (0.15) (0.71) (0.16)
Decile 4 0.27 0.71 0.85 0.60 0.02
(0.61) (0.20) (0.13) (0.30) (0.98)
Decile 5 −0.19 0.32 0.43 0.28 0.24
(0.73) (0.55) (0.42) (0.61) (0.68)
Decile 6 −0.02 0.26 0.07 0.03 −0.07
(0.98) (0.65) (0.90) (0.96) (0.90)
Decile 7 0.20 0.05 0.08 0.21 0.21
(0.73) (0.93) (0.90) (0.74) (0.76)
Decile 8 0.04 0.02 0.16 0.10 0.50
(0.95) (0.98) (0.82) (0.89) (0.49)
Decile 9 −0.73 0.06 −0.10 −0.13 −0.22
(0.14) (0.94) (0.91) (0.88) (0.76)
Decile 10 (most intangibles) −1.11 −0.41 −0.33 −0.28 −0.35
(0.10) (0.73) (0.23) (0.49) (0.77)
Decile 1− 10 2.53** 1.62** 1.45* 1.36 1.12
(0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.07) (0.17)
Quintile 1− 5 1.70* 1.13 0.98 0.77 0.59
(0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.21) (0.26)
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3. Fund Attributes
The existing literature suggests that certain fund attributes affect fund perfor-
mance, and perhaps the relation between IIR and fund returns (e.g., fund size in
Berk and Green (2004)). I perform robustness checks to see whether the main re-
sults hold across funds that vary in their attributes by double-sorting based on IIR
and various fund attributes. The main results hold across the subsamples of funds
that vary in their attributes (e.g., size and activeness). Due to space considerations,
these results are reported in Table A1 in the Online Appendix (www.jfqa.org).
4. Alternative Measures of Intangibles
Apart from innovative assets, a firm’s value may also be driven by intan-
gibles captured by advertising expenses or other noninnovative intangibles (e.g.,
copyrights). Furthermore, the investors’ ability to value intangibles may depend
on the category of intangibles. Table 9 reports 4-factor alphas for decile portfolios
TABLE 9
Portfolios of Mutual Funds Sorted on
Alternative Measures of Portfolio Concentration in Intangibles
Table 9 reports the portfolio-level 4-factor alphas from monthly net excess returns in quarter t + 2 of the funds in decile
portfolios based on various measures of mutual funds’ exposure to intangibles-intensive ﬁrms in quarter t. Columns 1–6
sort funds based on R&D as the measure of intangible assets. In column 7, funds are sorted based on the value-weighted
number of patents granted to a ﬁrm in the prior year. In columns 8–10, funds are sorted based on the value-weighted ratio
of PPE expenses to total assets, advertising expenses to PPE, and total intangibles as reported in accounting statements
to PPE. The p-values based on Newey-West (1987) robust standard errors with a lag length of 12 months are reported in
parentheses. ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Firms’ Intangibles Based on
Total
% R&D/ R&D/ R&D R&D Adver- Intan-
R&D R&D/ Book Market Capital/ Increase/ No. of PPE/ tising/ gibles/
Stocks Sales Equity Equity Assets Sales Patents Assets PPE PPE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile 1 (most tangibles) 1.25* 1.76** 1.95** 0.67 1.62** 1.21 0.62 –1.81** 0.50 –0.39
(0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) (0.07) (0.32) (0.01) (0.46) (0.53)
Decile 2 0.77 0.73 0.70 0.99* 0.74 0.28 0.58 –0.06 0.39 –0.03
(0.24) (0.23) (0.29) (0.05) (0.24) (0.60) (0.51) (0.95) (0.54) (0.95)
Decile 3 0.06 0.71 0.56 0.40 0.65 0.23 0.36 0.47 –0.23 –0.28
(0.93) (0.26) (0.37) (0.41) (0.32) (0.64) (0.67) (0.52) (0.70) (0.57)
Decile 4 –0.05 0.62 –0.18 0.23 0.34 0.66 0.81 0.16 0.37 0.11
(0.94) (0.28) (0.78) (0.88) (0.57) (0.20) (0.30) (0.80) (0.53) (0.83)
Decile 5 –0.40 –0.09 –0.07 0.03 –0.47 –0.04 0.20 0.38 –0.58 0.63
(0.55) (0.88) (0.91) (0.98) (0.43) (0.94) (0.74) (0.54) (0.34) (0.28)
Decile 6 –0.18 0.08 –0.23 0.02 –0.32 0.34 –0.72 0.14 –0.08 0.53
(0.78) (0.89) (0.70) (0.96) (0.62) (0.52) (0.20) (0.80) (0.90) (0.40)
Decile 7 0.15 –0.42 –0.18 –0.11 –0.26 –0.12 –0.20 0.13 0.40 0.99
(0.79) (0.47) (0.77) (0.80) (0.65) (0.85) (0.71) (0.79) (0.39) (0.15)
Decile 8 0.26 –0.50 0.03 –0.20 –0.38 –0.02 –0.42 0.01 –0.15 0.27
(0.64) (0.46) (0.96) (0.59) (0.59) (0.98) (0.33) (0.98) (0.82) (0.71)
Decile 9 –0.18 –0.77 –0.61 –0.45 –0.01 –0.99 –0.56 0.20 –0.22 –0.18
(0.78) (0.34) (0.40) (0.50) (0.97) (0.11) (0.20) (0.72) (0.61) (0.84)
Decile 10 (most intangibles) –0.76 –1.05 –0.98 –0.81 –0.98 –0.72 –0.90* 0.19 –0.48 –0.51
(0.21) (0.16) (0.18) (0.10) (0.10) (0.23) (0.05) (0.83) (0.34) (0.57)
Decile 1− 10 2.01** 2.81** 2.93** 1.48* 2.60** 1.93* 1.52* –2.00** 0.98 0.12
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.22) (0.81)
Quintile 1− 5 1.55* 2.02** 2.10** 0.98 1.95** 1.12 1.04 –1.49* 0.16 0.08
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.09) (0.01) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.75) (0.91)
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of funds formed based on the portfolio concentration in intangibles, measured as
the fraction of a fund’s portfolio invested in stocks of firms that spend on R&D
in column 1, and the value-weighted ratio of R&D expenses to various base vari-
ables in columns 2–4.17 In column 5, R&D capital is scaled by total assets;18
in column 6, annual R&D expense increase is scaled by lagged sales. Column
7 employs a widely used measure of innovative output (i.e., patents granted).
Column 8 sorts funds on the value-weighted PPE intensity. Finally, columns 9
and 10 present results based on other categories of intangibles (scaled by PPE)
that include noninnovative assets, namely, advertising and total intangible assets
(Compustat items 45 and 33). The results based on innovative assets (columns
1–7) are qualitatively very similar to those reported earlier. The decile 1–10 alpha
in column 8 is also consistent with other findings, since funds focused on firms
with low PPE intensity underperform those focused on firms with high PPE in-
tensity. Interestingly, returns do not vary significantly between funds that vary in
their exposure to intangibles-intensive firms based on advertising expenses and
total (accounting-based) intangible assets. These findings suggest that fund man-
agers perform poorly when they focus on firms valued on innovative assets, while
noninnovative intangibles do not appear to have a significant effect on abnormal
returns. Perhaps the long-term value of innovative assets is particularly hard to
assess due to their uniqueness to the firm (Aboody and Lev (2000)), while other
intangible inputs (e.g., advertising) may share more commonalities across firms.
5. Other Robustness Checks
Additional tests summarized in Table A2 in the Online Appendix show that
the results are not driven by the dot-com bubble and bust period (1997–2002),
since they hold in the 1980–1996, 1997–2002, and 2003–2009 periods. The re-
sults are also robust to skewness in returns, TNA weighting the alphas, exclusion
of technology stocks in computing IIR, and excluding funds with extreme TNA
and risk factor loadings, and do not simply mirror compositional effects related to
fund objectives.
F. Valuation Difficulty versus the Nature of the Firm
Can the cross-sectional differences in fund performance across funds that
vary in their IIR be attributed to the nature of the firm? In addition to the misvalu-
ation of intangibles, studies in behavioral finance suggest alternative channels via
which forecasting errors could enter fund managers’ valuation of firms. For in-
stance, when the information is sparse, and valuation uncertainty and information
asymmetry is high, behavioral biases lead to magnified forecasting errors (DHS
(1998), (2001)).
This section presents parsimonious tests that separate the effect of general
information problems from the effect of the nature of the firm. Controlling for
17Market value of equity is computed following Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001).
18Following Chan et al. (2001), the R&D CAPITAL for firm s at the end of year t in which annual
R&D expenses are denoted by RDs,t is computed as
(R&D CAPITAL)s,t = RDs,t + 0.8 RDs,t−1 + 0.6 RDs,t−2 + 0.4 RDs,t−3 + 0.2 RDs,t−4.
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information problems such as valuation uncertainty, if the performance of funds
with high IIR is similar to those with low IIR, the results reported in earlier sec-
tions are most likely driven by forecasting errors linked to general valuation diffi-
culties rather than the nature of the firm. For these tests, based on previous studies,
I first select the following asset characteristics that proxy for a firm’s information
environment: firm size, firm age, BM ratio, and volume turnover.19 While each of
these stock or firm attributes may reflect other noninformational factors (e.g., liq-
uidity), they share the theme of proxying for the difficulty in firm valuation. Based
on aggregating these asset characteristics on a value-weighted basis, I develop
fund-level measures of what I call the “proxies for valuation difficulty” (VD).
Table 10 reports 4-factor alphas for portfolios formed by double-sorting
funds on VD and IIR. Three portfolios of funds (low 25%, medium 50%, and
high 25%) are formed in each quarter, including funds that have a VD ranked in
the lowest 25%, middle 50%, and highest 25%. Within each group, funds are then
sorted into quintiles on IIR. The disparity in the risk-adjusted return of small-cap
funds (i.e., low 25% or high VD group based on SIZE SCORE) across IIR quin-
tiles is striking. Small-cap funds in IIR quintile 1 (quintile 5) produce an alpha of
3.01% (−2.42%). The IIR quintile 1–5 alpha for these funds is a large 5.43% per
year. Taken with the evidence in Schultz (2010) that funds focused on difficult-
to-value small firms outperform, it appears that fund managers display significant
skill when they focus on stocks with low information availability and high in-
formation asymmetry, except when they invest in intangibles-intensive innovative
segments.20 This is in spite of the fact that, controlling for firm size, firms having
intangible assets are actually linked to more analyst following and effort than tra-
ditional firms (Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (2001)). For the medium 50% and
high 25% SIZE SCORE groups, the IIR quintile 1–5 alphas remain positive and
significant. The results based on firm age, BM ratio, and trading volume are sim-
ilar. In general, the significantly positive (negative) alphas of larger magnitude
are generated by funds focused on difficult-to-value firms in the lower (higher)
IIR quintiles.
Overall, the results are consistent with the fund managers’ forecasting er-
rors in valuation being associated with the nature of the firm, and not by firms’
information problems per se.21 In fact, fund managers exhibit significant skill
when they focus on difficult-to-value firms in physical assets-intensive segments.
19Small-cap stocks have more information uncertainty and lower information availability due to
less analyst following (Zhang (2006), Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)). Young firms with shorter his-
tories have more information uncertainty and less publicly available information compared to older
firms. Glamour (i.e., low BM) stocks are valued based mainly on intangible information regarding
future growth prospects, where investors find intangible information difficult to process (DHS (2001),
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)). Volume turnover measured for a stock as the ratio of the
monthly trading volume to the shares outstanding proxies for the ambiguity in the stock’s true value
(Kumar (2009)).
20Consistent with Schultz (2010), who uses gross returns, the 4-factor alphas from net returns
reveal the outperformance of small-cap funds on average. The low 25% SIZE SCORE funds have an
overall mean alpha of 2.73% per year.
21Note that the analyses do not test for specific types of forecasting errors (e.g., errors due to
overconfidence vs. limited attention), since the main goal is to examine general forecasting errors,
irrespective of mechanism.
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TABLE 10
Portfolios of Mutual Funds Sorted on Proxies for Valuation Difficulty
and Portfolio Concentration in Intangibles
Funds are sorted into three groups representing the funds with the lowest 25%, middle 50%, and highest 25% in quarter
t based on valuation difﬁculty (VD) of portfolios: SIZE SCORE, AGE SCORE, BM SCORE, or TRADING VOLUME SCORE.
SIZE SCORE, AGE SCORE, BM SCORE, and TRADING VOLUME SCORE are the value-weighted DGTW (1997) size quin-
tile, ﬁrm age, DGTW BM quintile, and mean monthly trading volume in the most recent quarter across all the fund’s hold-
ings in the quarter, respectively. Within each group, funds are then sorted into quintiles based on IIR. Table 10 reports
the portfolio-level 4-factor alphas from monthly net excess returns in quarter t + 2 of the quintile portfolios within each
low-/medium-/high-VD group. The p-values (in parentheses) are based on Newey-West (1987) robust standard errors (lag
length of 12 months). ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
SIZE SCORE AGE SCORE
Low 25% Medium High 25% Low 25% Medium High 25%
IIR Quintile (t) (high VD) 50% (low VD) (high VD) 50% (low VD)
Quintile 1 (most tangibles) 3.01** 0.59 −0.45 2.27** 0.95 −0.55
(0.00) (0.40) (0.26) (0.01) (0.07) (0.23)
Quintile 2 1.83** −0.06 −0.72 0.79 0.96 −0.62
(0.01) (0.91) (0.18) (0.39) (0.10) (0.12)
Quintile 3 1.66* −0.39 −0.58 −0.24 −0.34 −0.19
(0.03) (0.40) (0.17) (0.81) (0.45) (0.59)
Quintile 4 0.33 −0.07 −0.77 −1.11 −0.21 −0.63
(0.74) (0.91) (0.10) (0.20) (0.69) (0.15)
Quintile 5 (most intangibles) −2.42* −1.58* −1.89** −2.44** −0.55 −1.64
(0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.54) (0.06)
Quintile 1− 5 5.43** 2.17** 1.44* 4.71** 1.50** 1.09
(0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08)
BM SCORE TRADING VOLUME SCORE
Low 25% Medium High 25% High 25% Medium Low 25%
IIR Quintile (t) (high VD) 50% (low VD) (high VD) 50% (low VD)
Quintile 1 (most tangibles) −0.05 0.37 1.21* 1.01* 1.08 1.02
(0.93) (0.46) (0.03) (0.05) (0.12) (0.06)
Quintile 2 −0.32 −0.08 0.29 −0.57 0.28 0.09
(0.66) (0.88) (0.55) (0.56) (0.65) (0.84)
Quintile 3 −0.69 −0.41 0.29 −1.13 0.00 0.62
(0.42) (0.31) (0.50) (0.17) (1.00) (0.19)
Quintile 4 −1.82* −0.37 0.25 −0.99 −0.43 −0.11
(0.02) (0.45) (0.61) (0.17) (0.48) (0.82)
Quintile 5 (most intangibles) −3.51** −1.01 0.20 −2.91** −0.80 −0.25
(0.00) (0.09) (0.73) (0.01) (0.07) (0.55)
Quintile 1− 5 3.46** 1.38* 1.01 3.92** 1.88* 1.27*
(0.00) (0.05) (0.15) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04)
It is plausible that learning from past experience and data equip fund managers’
valuation techniques to handle information difficulties in traditional firms, hence
turning mispricing into attractive opportunities, while the techniques for
intangibles-intensive firms remain flawed.22
G. Multivariate Regressions Explaining Fund Performance
The results reported earlier in nonparametric settings show that fund man-
agers outperform (underperform) when their portfolios are concentrated in
physical assets-intensive (intangibles-intensive) firms. Moreover, Table 2 shows
22This notion is consistent with the data, since the value-weighted firm age of the firms in which
funds with low IIR invest is twice that of the firms in which funds with high IIR invest.
Gupta-Mukherjee 187
a positive relation between a fund’s trend-chasing tendency and investments in
intangibles-intensive firms, alluding to forecasting errors arising from extrapola-
tion bias in valuing intangibles as a potential source of the underperformance of
funds with high IIR. If this trend-chasing tendency does indeed represent extrapo-
lation bias for funds with high IIR, it should be detrimental for fund performance.
Also, since prior studies suggest that forecasting errors and behavioral biases such
as extrapolation bias decrease with learning, prior experience of fund managers
could serve to reduce any such biases that affect their valuation of intangibles.
With these possibilities in mind, this section analyzes fund performance in a mul-
tivariate setting with a twofold purpose: to examine the robustness of the link
between IIR and fund returns in a parametric setting, and to explore whether ex-
trapolation bias and learning are among the channels via which the nature of the
firm affects fund performance.
In addition to the mean returns, I examine two other attributes of fund returns
that could be pertinent to mutual fund investors during the selection of funds
(i.e., volatility and maximum payoffs). Portfolio theory proposes that traditional
investors maximize expected returns and minimize the volatility of returns. Given
the higher volatility of R&D stocks (see Chan et al. (2001)), the volatility of fund
returns likely increases with IIR, thereby proposing another channel via which IIR
may affect the welfare of fund investors. Also, given the skewness of innovative
assets’ returns, investors may care about the potentially higher skewness of funds
with higher IIR.23
Table 11 presents the results of regressions explaining fund-level excess
returns, 4-factor alphas, volatility of excess returns (volatility), and maximum
excess returns (maximum return). A fund’s volatility and maximum return are
measured in month t as the standard deviation of the fund’s monthly excess re-
turns and maximum monthly excess returns over the next 12 months t + 1 to
t + 12. All specifications include year fixed effects. The significant negative re-
lation between IIR and fund performance (i.e., excess return and 4-factor alpha)
in specifications that control for fund fixed effects lends further support to the
preferred explanation of the main results in this study, that is, that fund managers
exhibit more skill when they focus on physical assets-intensive firms than when
they focus on intangibles-intensive firms, since the fixed effects largely subsume
any fund-, manager-, and family-level heterogeneities in skill and performance.
Several interesting results emerge when variables representing trend-chasing
behavior and prior experience are incorporated in columns 2 and 5. First, the
significantly negative coefficient on MOM SCORE × IIR shows that the return
of funds that exhibit trend-chasing behavior significantly decreases with their
IIR. These findings point to the trend-chasing behavior representing extrapola-
tion bias (vs. rational momentum strategies) for funds with higher IIR. Second,
consistent with fund managers learning about valuing intangibles with experience,
23Recent papers show that some stock market investors prefer assets with positive skewness in
returns, in spite of their potentially negative expected returns (e.g., Barberis and Huang (2008), Bali,
Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011)). For studies documenting the skewness of innovative asset returns, see
Scherer and Harhoff (2000), Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005), and Silverberg and Verspagen (2007).
Anecdotal evidence also points to high skewness in the returns on innovative assets such as patents.








Multivariate Regressions Explaining Attributes of Fund Returns
The dependent variables are annualized monthly excess returns (columns 1–3), monthly 4-factor alpha (columns 4–6), volatility (columns 7–9), and maximum return (columns 10–12) over the 3 months in each
quarter t + 2, respectively. Volatility and maximum return in a month are the standard deviation of monthly excess returns and the maximum monthly excess return over the next 12 months, respectively.
LAGGED IMT RETURN is the mean IMT portfolio return (deﬁned in Table 5) over the 6 months t − 5 to t. Fund controls (suppressed) are SIZE SCORE, BM SCORE, EXPENSE RATIO, TURNOVER, log(TNA),
INDUSTRY CONC, ACTIVE SHARE, and PAST FLOWS. All speciﬁcations include year ﬁxed effects, and fund or objective ﬁxed effects. The p-values (in parentheses) are based on Newey-West (1987) standard
errors with a lag length of 12 months, and account for clustering at the fund level. ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Excess 4-Factor Maximum
Return Alpha Volatility Return
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
IIR –0.148** –0.028* –0.031** –0.027** –0.019** –0.016** 0.017** 0.010** 0.017** 0.052** 0.201** 0.379**
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
IIR× LAGGED IMT RETURN –0.366* –0.562** –0.131* –0.157** 0.115** 0.115** 1.814** 1.796**
(0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IIR× MOM SCORE –0.042** –0.035** –0.028** –0.026** 0.001 0.000 0.026 0.011*
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.27) (0.23) (0.05)
LAGGED IMT RETURN 0.811** 0.860** 0.196** 0.190** –0.034** –0.038** –1.701** –1.791**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MOM SCORE –0.008* –0.002 0.001 –0.003* 0.002** 0.004** 0.015** 0.061**
(0.03) (0.36) (0.56) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
IIR× log(FUND AGE) 0.026** 0.019** 0.008* 0.009** –0.003** –0.003** –0.078** –0.102**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IIR× log(MANAGER TENURE) 0.013* 0.007 0.005 0.004 –0.002** –0.001* –0.077** –0.024**
(0.04) (0.10) (0.14) (0.26) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
log(FUND AGE) –0.017** –0.002 –0.012** –0.004** 0.001** 0.001** 0.014** 0.024**
(0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
log(MANAGER TENURE) –0.010** 0.000 –0.000 0.003** 0.001** –0.000 0.020** –0.002
(0.00) (0.98) (0.85) (0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) (0.47)
Fund ﬁxed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Fund controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Objective ﬁxed effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Year ﬁxed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
No. of obs. 285,970 279,452 166,449 265,773 259,255 146,252 274,827 267,711 154,708 274,827 267,711 154,708
R2 0.013 0.100 0.106 0.021 0.030 0.019 0.265 0.751 0.676 0.255 0.597 0.489
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the negative impact of IIR on returns significantly reduces with past experience.
The results are similar where fund fixed effects are replaced with objective fixed
effects and various untabulated fund-level control variables.
Additionally, columns 7–12 of Table 11 show that volatility and maximum
returns significantly increase with IIR. Taken together with earlier results on fund
returns, it is evident that the mean-variance efficiency of a fund’s portfolio de-
creases, and the maximum payoff increases, with the fund’s IIR. Furthermore, the
results in columns 7–12 suggest that trend-chasing behavior increases the volatil-
ity and maximum payoff of funds to a larger extent for funds with higher IIR,
and past experience reduces the positive impact of IIR on volatility and maximum
payoff.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Using the portfolio holdings of actively managed U.S. mutual funds, this pa-
per uncovers a significant link between the value created by fund managers’ skill
and the nature of the firms they invest in. First, fund managers exhibit signifi-
cantly inferior (superior) skill in generating risk-adjusted returns when their port-
folios are tilted toward stocks of intangibles-intensive (physical assets-intensive)
firms. The results are stronger when the factor models are adjusted for potential
omitted systematic factors associated with the nature of the firm. Funds tilted to-
ward intangibles-intensive firms underperform those tilted toward physical assets-
intensive firms in the intangibles-intensive as well as physical assets-intensive
components of their portfolios. Second, mutual fund managers tend to exhibit skill
when they focus on difficult-to-value firms, except when the difficult-to-value
firms are valued based on intangibles. Third, there is evidence that funds’ extrap-
olation bias increases with their focus on intangibles-intensive firms, and this bias
is detrimental to performance. In line with the presence of learning, the extrapo-
lation bias and the negative impact of investments in intangibles-intensive firms
on returns decrease with funds’ prior experience. Finally, the nature of the firm
affects the welfare of fund investors via multiple channels, since the maximum
payoff and volatility increases, and the mean-variance efficiency decreases, with
the funds’ exposure to intangibles-intensive firms.
The findings in this study raise several issues that may be promising
avenues for future research. Although this paper clearly suggests that mutual
funds tilted toward intangibles-intensive firms have inferior mean-variance
properties but higher maximum payoffs than those tilted toward physical assets-
intensive firms, it does not test whether fund investors account for how the prop-
erties of fund returns satisfy their preferences. Such clientele effects could be a
critical factor in the survival of poor performers. Also, this study calls atten-
tion to the possibility that active management may not justify its costs in some
market segments that seem to offer ample opportunities for exploiting market
inefficiencies (e.g., innovative firms). Further research along these lines could
lend fresh perspectives to comparisons between passive and active portfolio
management.
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